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11 Introduction
Spatial Cournot competition with linear demand at all addresses has tradi-
tionally been studied within a framework where the consumers’ distribution
across markets is uniform: a framework where, starting from the work by
Hamilton et al. (1989) and Anderson and Neven (1991), the standard result
is that ﬁrms agglomerate in the middle of the linear city. As is well known,
Gupta et al. (1997) showed how the features of the consumers’ distribution
crucially aﬀect such a result — agglomeration turns out to be conditional on
the density not being ‘too thin’ around the ﬁrms’ equilibrium location. They
also enquired about dispersion equilibria in the case of symmetric densities
by presenting some examples, all of which use (roughly speaking) U-shaped
distributions.
These results suggest that whether agglomeration or dispersion obtains
in equilibrium should depend on how consumers are distributed across mar-
kets.1 In this paper we build upon the work by Gupta et al. (1997) to
derive necessary conditions for a pair of locations to be an equilibrium in
the duopoly case with a generic density. In particular, this enables us to
show that a necessary condition for dispersion to be an equilibrium is that
the distribution be not unimodal. Our results are derived under assumptions
about parameters which ensure that all markets are served in equilibrium —
which, as is well known, amounts to transportation costs being low enough
relative to the consumers’ reservation price.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the basic
model and characterize its equilibrium locations as the solution to a two-
equation system. Section 3 derives non-unimodality as a necessary condition
for dispersion to be an equilibrium. Section 4 gathers some concluding re-
marks.
2 Equilibrium
In this section we review the basic duopoly model with Cournot spatial com-
petition and give a general formulation of its equilibrium conditions for a
generic consumer distribution.
Two ﬁrms located on the unit interval sell a homogeneous product to be
1Notice however that switching to the circular road model may yield dispersion (Pal,
1998), while Benassi et al. (2007) show that one other key variable is the level of trans-
portation costs (relative to the consumers’ reservation price): dispersion is the unique
equilibrium in the linear city with a uniform distribution when such costs are high enough
(A < 1 in our notation).
2delivered in spatially diverse locations. Firm i = 1,2, located in xi ∈ [0,1]
bears a linear transportation cost t|x − xi|, t > 0, to deliver its product
at location x ∈ [0,1]; production takes place at constant marginal costs
(standardly normalized at zero). Consumers are distributed as F : [0,1] →
[0,1] over the same interval, F diﬀerentiable with mean µ; the (inverse)
market demand at location x is linear and given by
px = a − bqx (1)
where qx ≥ 0 is the total quantity supplied at x, and a and b are strictly pos-
itive. We study the perfect equilibrium of the two stage game where ﬁrms
choose their locations in the ﬁrst stage, and the quantities they produce in
the second stage of the game. By backward induction we ﬁrst character-
ize the second stage Cournot equilibrium for given locations. To do so, we
assume that A = a/t > 2 to ensure that all markets are covered at equi-
librium (e.g., Gupta et al., 1997, p.264), and note that the assumption of
constant marginal costs allows to look at the quantity equilibrium as a set
of independent Cournot equilibria, one for each location x ∈ [0,1].
The proﬁt ﬁrm i = 1,2 (i ￿= j = 1,2), located at xi, obtains from the
market located in x is given by




x(xi,xj) is the output it sells at x and qx = q1
x(x1,x2) + q2
x(x1,x2) is
the total output available at location x. At the unique Cournot equilibrium,
ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are given by
￿ πi(xi,xj;x) = 1
9b (a + t|x − xj| − 2t|x − xi|)
2 (2)
which depend on both ﬁrms’ locations, and are to be used to determine the
perfect equilibrium locations in the ﬁrst stage. To do so, we write the ﬁrst





where we integrate over all markets and (letting primes denote derivatives)
f(x) = F￿(x) is the (strictly positive) continuous density describing the con-
sumers’ distribution across locations.
A perfect Nash equilibrium in locations is then given by the pair (x∗
1,x∗
2)
such that ∂Πi(xi,xj)/∂xi = 0 (i ￿= j = 1,2), and each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is maxi-
mized. Straightforward calculations impose that the second order conditions







1) ≥ 1 (4)




is the non negative equilibrium distance between the ﬁrms.
The ﬁrms’ equilibrium locations are identiﬁed by the following result,
derived for a generic consumer density:
Proposition 1 Let (x∗
1,x∗
2) = (x∗,x∗ + δ
∗), δ
∗ ≥ 0, be the equilibrium loca-
tions of ﬁrms i = 1,2. Then the pair (x∗,δ


























Proposition 1, which follows directly from equations (4.4) and (4.5) of Gupta
et al. (1997), amounts to identifying the pair (x∗
1,x∗
2) at which the ﬁrst
order conditions for both ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problems are satisﬁed,
and accordingly provides necessary conditions for a perfect equilibrium in
(quantities and) locations. As per (4), suﬃcient conditions also require that
the second order constraints f(x∗
i)(A + δ
∗) ≥ 1, i = 1,2, hold, while we know
from Gupta et al. (1997, p.265) that no ﬁrm’s equilibrium location will ever
be 0 or 1.2
We report in Figure 1 an example of equilibrium dispersion with a sym-
metric density, based on Gupta et al. (1997, p.280): we plot the mappings
xa (δ) (dotted) and xb(δ) (solid) which solve equations (5.a,b), such that
(x∗
1,x∗
2) = (0.4,0.6) and hence δ
∗ = 0.2.3
2These authors’ proof relies on diﬀerentiating each ﬁrm’s proﬁt function (3) with respect
to its own location, to get that limx1→0+ ∂Π1/∂x1 > 0 and limx2→1− ∂Π2/∂x2 > 0.
3This is Gupta et al.’s example 7 (see also their f.note 6, p.280), where the density is
f(x) = 1/2 + 6(x − 1/2)2, symmetric with mean µ = 1/2, and A = 2.681; the second
order bounds on the density are satisﬁed at (x∗
1,x∗
2). Notice that in general xb(δ) is not a
one-to-one function, since clearly equation (5.b) may have more than one solution. Also,
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Figure 1. Equilibrium dispersion
We now turn to discussing dispersion equilibria.
3 Dispersion
Let h(x,A) = x − µ + [1 − 2F(x)]A, and let some ￿ x ∈ (0,1) be a solution
to h(·,A) = 0. It is then obvious by inspection that (x∗,δ
∗) = (￿ x,0) is a
solution to (5.a,b): i.e., agglomeration is a (candidate) equilibrium — actually,
one such always exists whenever the density is unimodal,4 and indeed Gupta
et al. (1997) show that in general agglomeration can be an equilibrium
only if the density is ‘thick’ enough around the ﬁrms’ location. However,
their discussion about dispersion relies mainly on examples of symmetric
densities, all of which are (roughly speaking) U-shaped. This suggests that
non unimodality be somehow crucial for the existence of dispersion equilibria.
In this section we show that this is indeed the case.
Two general observations should be made as preliminary remarks. First,
independently of the actual shape of the distribution, ﬁrms cannot locate too
far apart from each other, as the following Lemma applies
Lemma 1 Let (x∗
1,x∗
2) = (x∗,x∗ + δ
∗), δ
∗ > 0, be a pair of dispersed




4This is an implication of Gupta et al. (1997, p.269), as unimodality implies the
existence of a ’modal interval’ I ⊂ (0,1) such that f(x) > 1 for all x ∈ I. Notice that
h(0,A) > 0 > h(1,A), so that h(·,A) = 0 has always a solution.





∗ ≥ A: since A > 2, this implies δ
∗ = x∗
2 − x∗
1 > 1, a
contradiction.
Secondly, Proposition 1 suggests that the existence of a dispersion equilib-
rium places some restrictions on the concavity of the consumers’ density.
Indeed, letting F(x∗ + δ
∗) − F(x∗) = ∆F∗, equation (5.b) can be written
as ∆F ∗/δ
∗ = 3/2(A + δ
∗): since by the mean value theorem there trivially
exists some z ∈ (x∗,x + δ
∗) such that f(z) = ∆F ∗/δ
∗, at a dispersed equi-
librium one must have 2
3f(z) = 1/(A + δ
∗) ≤ f(x∗
i), i = 1,2: i.e., the second
order conditions for maximum proﬁts (see (4)) set limits on how thick the
density between locations can be, which actually vindicates Gupta et al.’s
(1997, p.277) emphasis on densities that are not unimodal.
Together with Lemma 1, this intuition accounts for the following result:
Proposition 2 Let (x∗
1,x∗
2) = (x∗,x∗ + δ
∗), δ
∗ > 0, be a pair of dispersed
equilibrium locations. Then the density f(x) is not unimodal.
Proof. See Appendix
Clearly, a natural implication of Proposition 2 is that non-unimodality is
required for the co-existence of equilibria with and without dispersion.
4 Concluding remarks
In this note we have considered the standard model of spatial Cournot com-
petition with two ﬁrms, to set up a general expression for identifying the
ﬁrms’ equilibrium locations. This allows to establish that non-unimodality
is a necessary condition for the existence of dispersion equilibria.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization, given deﬁnition (2) and
solving integrals, reduce to
A[1 − 2F(x1)] − [1 + 2F(x1)]δ + x1 − µ + 2I(x1,x2) = 0 (A.1.a)
A[1 − 2F(x2)] + [1 − 2F(x2)]δ + x2 − µ + 2I(x1,x2) = 0 (A.1.b)
where to ease notation we let δ = x2 − x1 ≥ 0 and I(x1,x2) =
￿ x2
x1 F(x)dx.




δ + δ∆F = 0 (A.2.a)
A[1 − ΣF] +
x1 + x2
2
− δΣF − µ + 2I(x1,x2) = 0 (A.2.b)





(2I(x1,x2) + x1 − µ + [1 − 2F(x1)]A) (A.3)
which, letting equilibrium values x∗
1 = x∗ and x∗
2 = x∗ + δ
∗, amounts to
equation (5.a).
By subtracting (A.2.b) from (A.2.a) we now get
[1 − 2F(x2)]δ = −{2I(x1,x2) + x2 − µ + [1 − 2F(x2)]A}
7which, solving for δ from (A.3) and letting x2 = x1 + δ gives, after sempliﬁ-






which can be solved for ∆F = F(x∗ + δ
∗) − F(x∗) to give equation (5.b).￿
Proof of Proposition 2
If (x∗,x∗ + δ
∗) is a pair of equilibrium dispersed locations, δ
∗ ∈ (0,1 − x∗)
must satisfy the twin conditions
κ(δ
∗) = 0 (A.5.a)
λ(δ
∗) = 0 (A.5.b)
where, using (5.a,b), the following deﬁnitions apply:












here h(x∗,A) = x∗−µ+[1 − 2F(x∗)]A and, to ease notation, ∆(δ) = F(x∗+
δ) − F(x∗), an increasing function. Both κ and λ are continuous functions.
We now proceed in three steps:
(i) The function κ(δ) is strictly concave for any δ ∈ [0,1−x∗], increasing
at least up to some ￿ δ ∈ (δ
∗,1 − x∗], and such that κ(0) = −h(x∗,A) < 0
and κ￿(δ
∗) < 1. Indeed, diﬀerentiation shows that κ￿(δ) = 1 − 2∆(δ), clearly
decreasing and positive for δ ≤ δ
∗, as by Lemma 1 ∆(δ
∗) < 1/2: hence,
κ(0) = −h(x∗,A) < 0 and that κ￿(δ
∗) > 0. Since (A.5.a) is a necessary
condition for equilibrium, this ensures that for the given x∗ there is only one
δ
∗ such that (x∗,x∗ + δ
∗) is an equilibrium location pair.
(ii) The function λ(δ) is such that:


































A + 1 − x∗ > 0 (A.8)
8which amounts to (A−x∗)(A+1−x∗)−3A(1−x∗) > 0: this is surely true
for any x∗ ∈ [0,1] and A > 2.
(b) there are at least two values of δ in the interval (0,1−x∗) such that
the derivative of λ(δ) vanishes. To see this, notice that λ cannot be monotone
as λ(0) = λ(δ
∗) = 0. Also, λ(1 − x∗) > 0 implies the existence of some
￿ δ ∈ (0,1−x∗) such that￿ δ ≥ δ
∗, with λ(￿ δ) = 0 < λ
￿(￿ δ) and λ(δ) > 0 for all δ ∈
(￿ δ,1−x∗). Let now Γ(δ) = κ￿(δ)λ(δ)+κ(δ), such that Γ(0) = Γ(δ
∗) = 0: there
has to be some δ ∈ (0,δ











κ￿(δ) < 0: since λ
￿(δ) + 1 = f(x + δ) +
2(A+δ)2−3A
2(A+δ)2 > 0 for all δ ∈ [0,1 − x∗] and κ is concave, it must be λ(δ) > 0.
All of which implies that λ
￿(δ) changes sign at least twice over [0,￿ δ]: there
is at least a pair (δ1,δ2), δ1 < δ2, say, δi ∈ (0,￿ δ) for i = 1,2, such that
λ
￿(δi) = 0.
(iii) By (A.6.b), it is now easily seen that f(x∗ + δ1) > f(x∗ + δ2),
since λ
￿(δi) = 0 is equivalent to f(x∗ + δi) = 3
2
A
(A+δi)2 and δ1 < δ2. Hence,
unimodality is ruled out if one can ﬁnd some δ3 > δ2 such that f(x∗ +δ3) >
f(x∗ + δ2). To do so, consider the function θ(δ) =
1−F(x∗)











(A+δ)2 > 0: as θ is strictly convex, θ
￿(δ) > 0 if θ
￿(0) ≥ 0, i.e.
1−F(x∗)
1−x∗ ≥ 3





2A(1−x∗), so that θ
￿(0) > 0 if A+2x∗ +µ−3 ≥ 0. That the




∗−µ+[1 − 2F(x∗ + δ
∗)](A+δ
∗) < 0: this
follows from (A.5) and the deﬁnitions (A.6), by noting that δ
∗ [1 + 2F(x∗)] >
h(x∗,A) and substituting for F(x∗) from (A.5b); there follows µ > x∗ +δ
∗ +
[1 − 2F(x∗ + δ
∗)](A+δ





(b’) by substituting back F(x∗ + δ
∗)(A + δ
∗) from (A5.b) we get
A+2x∗ +µ−3 > 2A−3(1−x∗)−δ
∗ +2(A+δ
∗)F(x∗) > 0: which holds as
3(1 − x∗) + δ
∗ < 4, while 2A > 4.
Now notice that by construction￿ δ > δ2 > δ1 and θ(￿ δ) =
1−F(x∗)
1−x∗ ￿ δ−∆(￿ δ) >




￿ δ , so that
there exists some δ3 ∈ [￿ δ,1−x∗] such that
∆(1−x∗)




1−x∗ − f(x∗ + δ2): hence f(x∗ + δ2) <
∆(1−x∗)
1−x∗ < f(x + δ3).￿
9